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How can the EU survive in a post crisis world, given the asymmetry of its decision-making apparatus? Andreas
Follesdal argues that this, along with other issues that beset the aimed democratisation of European institutions,
hinders the creation of a real culture of democratic accountability and legitimacy. 
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Many reflective scholars voice concern about persistent features of the EU that hinder realistic democratic control,
concerns whose urgency has increased dramatically with the euro crisis and the responses to it. A remarkable
feature of these contributions is how much they differ in their diagnosis and hence prescriptions.
To illustrate, for Majone, the ‘Community Method’ is part of the problem, whilst for Habermas more of the
‘Community Method’ is part of the solution. The more fundamental concern is arguably the normative legitimacy of
the EU. One influential strand of proposals has been to address the alleged legitimacy deficit by increased measures
of democratic deliberation and accountability. I suggest that we need to reconsider our democratic standards,
especially if the EU keeps features of an asymmetrical federal order with different constituent parts enjoying different
levels of influence and power.
Symptoms (alleged and real) and diagnosis
Some symptoms of a democratic (and or legitimacy) deficit such as low voter turn out seem open to alternative
diagnoses, so that some such statements are contested and perhaps unduly critical. Other symptoms merit more
concern
The Power of the Commission and the Practice of ‘Open Method of Coordination’
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Several scholars have noted persistent institutional features that prevent effective direct and indirect
democratic control of important agents in the EU. Giandomenico Majone’s recent book Europe as the Would-be
World Power: The EU at Fifty urges a downsizing an EU that has expanded far beyond what Majone had
recommended. He also diagnoses some of the fundamental structural flaws, especially the dominance of the
Commission. Similar skepticism is due the ‘Open Method of Coordination’ (OMC) as a mode of decision-making
whereby the Commission facilitates agreement among the states to ‘soft’ guidelines and targets. This runs counter
to those who have high hopes about OMC as an innovative alternative to hierarchical political accountability, on the
grounds that it is better at promoting deliberation, problem-solving, and participation by all groups.
I submit that the claims made in favour of OMC remain unsupported. One early commentator correctly claimed that
‘if the structure of the network in terms of interest representation is well balanced, the network will tend to open up
policy-shaping opportunities for a variety of diverse actors without interests being realized at the cost of third
parties’. However, critics question whether such conditions ever hold, and if so, how they are maintained. In
addition, several questions remain about the ‘deliberative quality’ of the processes.
Lack of Political Community/European Identity
Several authors lament the lack of a murkily defined ‘European identity’. Why? First, ordinary citizens are sometimes
asked to refrain from benefits in order to benefit other members of the citizenry out of a sense of solidarity (of an ‘us’)
or compassion. Second, those who lose out in majoritarian decisions of EU bodies must still be expected to comply,
and the motivation for this may stem from a belief that the system is fair, and that their turn will come in due course.
 Such complex motivations may be referred to as a shared ‘identity’.
These conditions are a crucial challenge to prescriptions for massive redistribution in response to the euro crisis.
Third, law-makers and treaty-negotiators must be trusted to not only to promote their own constituency, but to also
consider the interests of other Europeans, a ‘we’ beyond state borders. The details of the requisite European identity
remains contested, such as whether ‘constitutional patriotism’ would be required, and what unique European
features to add, if any are required.
Poor Democratic Institutions
Several observations are taken to suggest a low quality of democratic governance in the EU. Several necessary
components of a halfway defensible democracy appear to be missing in the EU—such as sufficient popular control
over executive and legislative bodies; a sufficiently well-functioning set of parties competing for votes on the basis of
deliberation and contestation; or a shared sense of the objectives of the Union. Some of these may be temporary, or
others may not indicate a lack of democratic institutions at all. Some such lacunae may diminish over time, thus
some pessimism may be overdrawn.
Yet persistent federal features of the EU will continue to hinder the institutions and culture required for standard
democratic rule; in particular the asymmetric elements of the Union, and intra-EU mobility. The standards for stability
and criteria of a sufficiently well-working democracy in the EU should be informed by similar discussions of stability
and democracy in multilevel political orders generally.
In political orders with federal elements the distinction is less clear between stable constititutional frames and the
politically contentious conflicts among political parties within them. In these political orders, constitutional issues are
more often on the political agenda, risking stability and unity to a greater extent. Persistent federal features of the EU
will continue to hinder the institutions and culture required for standard democratic rule; in particular the asymmetric
elements of the Union, and intra-EU mobility.
Prescriptions
Several prescriptions are more questionable than would first appear.
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‘The EU isn’t undemocratic, so don’t try to fix it!’
The first prescription worthy of mention is one argued for by some authors: let it be!
Reduce the EU’s competences, and instead develop a ‘Club Good’ m odel for the EU
Majone draws creatively on the theory of clubs to argue that the EU should have its powers shorn, and that it should
focus on a programme of ‘differentiated integration’, creating collaboration among the willing states, in different
combinations and in different sectors. But while there are several benefits of such a model, how should parties go
about establishing and delineating the competences of each club under conditions of complex interdependence?
Give the EU a global mission/a raison d’être as a shared identity
In response to the legitimacy deficit, De Búrca advocates that the EU should exercise significant global leadership.
This seems a plausible place to look, particularly in light of the tragedies in Bosnia and Kosovo. But the list of
candidate global problems must be pruned in two ways: The EU should only take on problems it is likely to help
solve. The EU’s recent track record regarding the euro thus counsels caution. Second, considerations of subsidiarity
urge modesty. The EU should stick to objectives for which it can plausibly claim comparative advantage over the
efforts of member states. Moreover, successful resolution of this carefully selected set of problems will often impose
burdens unevenly among member states – thus this will not reduce the need for democratic accountability,
deliberation, and contestation, but will rather require more of the same.
Centralise more powers and reconceptualise the EU as ‘solidarity’
Jürgen Habermas has recently argued on the basis of the Euro crisis that the EU should be reconstructed into a
political Union, with less powers in the hands of the member states and an attendant elaboration of interstate
solidarity. Habermas chooses to elaborate only some of several – mutually compatible – explanations of  the
emergence of the Euro crisis: undemocratic central decisions, coupled with myopic state government responses.
This is strikingly different from (though not incompatible with) the diagnoses of other analysts, e.g. that the eurozone
is an non-optimal currency area.
Increase the European Commission’s accountability
Several authors including Weiler propose steps to make the Commission more accountable, and seek to lay to rest
the long-standing claim that the Commission will be ‘an international (supposedly) a-political transnational
administration/executive’. I agree that we should instead acknowledge that ‘the European interest’ is contested, and
that the Commission’s conscious or less reflective choice to pursue certain interpretations above others must be
more public—and contested.
Consider Mechanisms from the Federal Tradition
Improvements to the decision-making institutions of the EU should be informed by the experiences in the federal
tradition, where sovereignty in the sense of the final say on various political issues is divided between a centre and
the member units. The good news is that a more legitimate EU from this perspective need not require citizens to
transfer their political loyalty to the EU, but rather to foster political loyalty toward several political orders, as in
federations.
The bad news is that comparative studies of federalism warn of a higher level of ongoing constitutionalcontestation
concerning the constitution and its values and interpretation than in unitary political orders. Stabilizing mechanisms
are even more important in these states, to prevent citizen disenchantment and the disintegration of the political
order.
Prognosis
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The challenges to bring the EU into conformity with democratic theory and practice are twofold: it is not only the EU
that needs to be reformed, but also our democratic standards, since some persistent features of the EU go to the
core of assumptions for democratic rule. At stake are both questions of demos, and questions of impact. Central
premises for many theories of democracy are that those who are equally affected by shared institutions, should
have an equal say in how they are run and modified. Several aspects of the EU challenge the relevance of these
assumptions, especially if it remains differentially integrated.
Asymmetric Union: Not Similar Impact On All Affected
In ‘asymmetrical’ political orders such as the EU member units have pooled different competences. Thus citizens
and authorities of different member units are correct in holding different views about the objectives of the central
unit.
This lack of shared objectives raises concerns for attempts to identify recommendations for a more democratic EU:
who should have influence on which decisions, and what should guide their choices? There is currently little in the
way of a shared ‘meta-ideology’ about the objectives of the EU. If the Union continues to be asymmetric, this deep
disagreement will remain.
A European party system which could foster such cross-cutting loyalties is underdeveloped. But we may expect
polarizing constitutional politicization about the polity and the regimes of the EU for a long time to come, with no
finalite of agreement. Moreover, federal orders also suffer a higher risk of instability of two kinds: they tend toward
fragmentation—indeed secession— or complete centralization.
Conclusion
A differentially integrated—or asymmetric— EU will continue to hinder the institutions and culture required for
standard democratic rule. This would seem to be true regardless of whether the EU ends up as a strongly
centralised federal political order as Habermas suggests, or as a ‘Europe à la carte’ à la Majone. We may take
some meagre comfort by comparing the EU to other political orders with federal elements – but  federations also
tend to be less stable, and the requisite dual loyalty often insufficient. Thus, the appropriate standards of democratic
governance may have to be revised in light of the multilevel nature of the EU.
The Union may still fall short of such ideals, and reforms to improve its democratic quality may not be easily within
reach, particularly in the face of urgent crisis. Nevertheless, to not urge reforms to make the EU more responsive to
the best interests of its citizens would be even worse.
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